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Since almost the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis in 2009,
speculation began as to whether this would be a turning
point announcing the end of one of the longest periods of
peace, stability and democratic normality Greece ever
witnessed in its near 200 years history; a period that goes by
the name ‘Metapolitefsi’ (regime change). The latter term
designates the period from the restoration of democracy in
the summer of 1974 until…well, it seems that until now we
were not sure of its end date. However, in all probability we
now know -to paraphrase John Lewis Gaddis- that we are
experiencing the death of a regime that promised to deliver a
great deal but eventually led to Greece’s ruin and appears
likely to go down in infamy, disgrace and national
humiliation.
 
Things did not look so gloomy in the summer of 1974 when Constantinos Karamanlis arrived in Athens’ airport
invited by the military junta in a desperate effort to avert a looming national disaster. The tragedy eventually did
happen: one third of Cyprus succumbed to the Turkish invasion, with Karamanlis being unable to do much about it.
The period that was inaugurated by the voting of a new constitution in 1975 marked the beginning of a new era and
a new ethos in Greek politics. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) was legalised, Greek political exiles were able to
return and the country set out to restore political unity, re-establish democratic rule, and heal its wounds. Despite the
favourable omens, however, the new regime established by Karamanlis, suffered from constitutive deficiencies that
undermined its long-term prospects and its ability to progress into a mature democracy with strong institutions,
healthy fiscal practices and consensual political culture. Karamanlis himself recognising the polarised nature of
Greek politics and the deeply-ingrained populist sentiment of self-victimisation pervading Greek society adopted a
bifurcated strategy that revealed both his vision as well as his political Machiavellianism. On the one hand, he went
to great lengths to secure the country’s accession to the EU signed in 1979. To his mind, that would ensure both
democratic stability and political legitimacy for the new regime, not to mention the prospects of economic prosperity
and geopolitical security that the entry to the EU promised. At the same time, however, mindful of the dynamics of
Greek politics and the lack of a mature political culture, he did not refrain from the old die-hard populist practices that
would become endemic in Greek politics in the years to follow. In an effort to secure absolute control on the
country’s politico-economic establishment and avert the rise of populist Pasok, he nationalised Greek public service
companies and inaugurated the habit of hiring party members or party favourites in sensitive public sector positions.
The seeds of what would become the scourge of Greek political life, clientelism, cronyism and petty-party politics,
were quite early sown.
Andreas Papandreou, a phenomenal demagogue and charismatic popular leader, had only to take advantage of
those structures already in place to impose the first fully populist regime in Greece that openly operated on the basis
of extreme party polarisation, vindictive rhetoric and open favouritism. Papandreou took advantage of the
abundance of free-floating sovereign investment funds in the ‘80s (mostly pouring out of a stagflating Japanese
economy) to introduce a rentier state-sponsored economy that thrived on parasitism and a cartel-run domestic
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market. At the same time the flux of EU money and the almost total absence of effective EU monitoring allowed the
creation of an army of rentiers, cronies, praetorians and oligarchs of the new populist regime that almost threatened
the Greek economy with a spectacular bankruptcy in the beginning of the ‘90s. In the meantime, the country’s
constitutional situation was deteriorating as the 1985 constitutional amendment removed any checks and balances
and granted almost untrammelled power to the ruling majority and practically to a close circle of party aids and
magnates around the prime minister (the trivialisation of the constitution culminated in the 2000 amendment). The
anaemic and half-hearted efforts by the following governments, including Papandreou’s second administration
(1993-96), to save the day through emergency austerity measures only perpetuated the deadlocks and veiled the
embeddedness and widespread appeal the culture of populism enjoyed in Greece post-1980s.
 
In fact, as a result of the rising living standards financed by foreign loans and perennial fiscal deficits, rentocratic
populism infiltrated all the strata of the Greek political system across the spectrum rising to the status of political and
fiscal orthodoxy representing, in a perverse Orwellian twist, the hallmark of progressive politics (!). The entry in the
Eurozone was a decision based on seemingly sane economic facts (currency stability) and wishful projections
(incentive for reforms to boost competitiveness) but in reality helped only to secure a semblance of false prosperity
financed by the massive influx of cheap credit that flooded the country post-2000. In an unholy alliance with a
number of economic oligarchs (in banking, oil, shipping, public construction, and media industries) that benefitted
from close proximity with the government, the primary beneficiaries of the new system were successive
governments that engaged in a sinful entanglement with ‘vested interests’ securing public contracts and controlling
public opinion through docile media. These practices did not only penetrate the establishment parties (Pasok and
ND) but the Left as well which was given a share in the ‘Metapolitefsi’ regime (mutual implication in rentierism
secured complicity and appeased leftist populist sentiments). University professors, intellectuals, politicians,
journalists and trade unionists across the political spectrum (with only few exceptions) tolerated or became
staunch supporters of a degenerating pension system, unsustainable fiscal policies and a dysfunctional state
bureaucracy already undermined by the aforementioned populist policies and practices of favouritism. Rentocracy
was given an ideological gloss pervading pro-austerity and anti-austerity forces, which explains the confusion
around the cross-party resistance against pension reforms and spending cuts in Greece. Instead of introducing a
genuine progressive transformation of society, the Left became the forerunner of conservative resistance to much-
needed reforms as it opted for the easy route: the defence of clientelism and parasitism as opposed to a long-term
reform strategy that would boost Greek competitiveness and build up sustainable growth structures. This entire
perversity was sustained by an unfair system of taxation that put emphasis on high indirect taxes (sharpening
inequalities) and the squeezing of every productive sector of the economy. When push came to shove the only
refuge for a failed and putrid political class was blame-shifting, polarisation and obfuscation of the real issues at
hand. The referendum is simply the last desperate act of violence of a crumbling nomenclature on a disoriented
populace.
 
We have now arrived at the end of a long (41 years) road. Not everything ‘Metapolitefsi’ stood for should be
condemned. It was the longest period of political stability and democratic rule the country ever enjoyed ensuring
Greece’s participation in the European experiment, a process that despite the many challenges it is faced with
remains committed to creating a common space of security, prosperity and freedom. All these are now questioned or
under threat in Greece. Feelings of humiliation and frustration abound amongst a people that was consistently
misled and let down by its leaders, and pushed around by Europe’s intransigence and myopia. Greeks are now
faced with a dim future. Banks are indefinitely closed, capital controls imposed and there is only a glimmer of hope
for recovery or return to normality. This situation is most probably the premonition of regime change. This can go
both ways. The way of extreme poverty, domestic instability, autarchic rule and geopolitical isolation is one; or the
route of a real change through the voting of a new constitution and the revitalisation of Greek political life around the
values of freedom, the rule of law, and social solidarity within a broader European family of nations. It is by now
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widely manifested that the real obstacle to Greece’s recovery is a parochial, blocked and immature political system
that is refusing to simply step down insisting on parading its decomposed carcass like an undead zombie. The duty
of the next day is first to realise the nature of the deadlock and then to reactivate our political imagination towards re-
building the country from scratch. Let us hope this is done before a new national security tragedy, similar to the
Cyprus invasion that made ‘Metapolitefsi’ possible, erupts and the wounds of national disunity fester. Let us hope
this is not the only way Greeks learn their lesson.
 
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog, EUROPP,
nor of the London School of Economics.
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